DRUG MARKETS AND URBAN VIOLENCE: Can tackling one reduce the other?

Alex Stevens and Dave Bewley-Taylor, with contributions from Pablo Dreyfus

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The Beckley Foundation Drug Policy Programme (BFDPP) is an initiative dedicated to providing a rigorous, independent review of the effectiveness of national and international drug policies. The aim of this programme of research and analysis is to assemble and disseminate material that supports the rational consideration of complex drug policy issues, and leads to a more effective management of the widespread use of psychoactive substances in the future. The BFDPP currently chairs the International Drug Policy Consortium (www.idpc.info), a global network of NGOs and professional networks who work together to promote objective debate around national and international drug policies, and provide advice and support to governments in the search for effective policies and programmes.

INTRODUCTION

One of the most worrying aspects of the global trade in illicit drugs is the link to urban violence. This is a leading cause of death in many countries. It is also linked to other harms, such as morbidity, reductions in economic growth and the opportunity costs of investments in incarceration, police forces and private security which attempt to control violence. This Report builds on other Beckley Foundation Drug Policy Programme publications that have looked at issues of crime prevention, treatment and drug markets (Stevens, Hallam, & Trace, 2006; Stevens, Trace, & Bewley-Taylor, 2005; Wilson & Stevens, 2008). Here we look specifically at the strength of the link between drug markets and urban violence, and policies and tactics that can be used to reduce this link.

RATES OF URBAN VIOLENCE

In recent years, the Caribbean has taken over from Latin America as the region most affected by lethal violence (UNODC & World Bank, 2007). Murder rates in Jamaica have reached 58 per 100,000 population, with the city of Kingston most affected by violent disputes between rival gangs. Some Latin American cities have become less murderous than they were in the 1990s. Bogotá, for example, used to be known as the most violent city in the World, but its murder rate declined to 21 per 100,000 population in 2004. By contrast, violence has escalated in Caracas. Its murder rate in 2005 has been estimated at 130 per 100,000. No other city recorded such extreme murder rates, although New Orleans and Cape Town both have estimated rates of over 60 murders per 100,000. US cities vary widely in their murder rates. Nationally, homicide fell from historically high levels between 1993 and 2005, since when it has risen again (Braga, Pierce, McDevitt, Bond, & Cronin, 2008). In 2005, Baltimore had a murder rate of 42 and Washington DC had a rate of 35 per 100,000. But homicide in places like New York and Los Angeles has fallen dramatically since the early 1990s. New York is now one of the safest cities in the USA, having a murder rate of 7 per 100,000 in 2005. But it still has a higher rate than most European cities. In this continent, only Moscow, Tallinn and Vilnius have rates higher than New York. Glasgow has a slightly lower rate, but most European capitals – including London, Berlin, Brussels, Paris, Helsinki and Dublin - have much lower rates, around 2 or 3 per 100,000 of population. Rates in Auckland and Sydney are comparable. Tokyo’s murder rate is lower at 1.4 per 100,000. Murder rates in many other cities are not systematically reported. It is important to note that murder is of course not the only form of violence. Indeed, it is the rarest. Violence in general is very difficult to define (de Haan, 2008), but can include threats, assaults, sexual violations and other forms of interpersonal conflict.  

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DRUG MARKETS AND URBAN VIOLENCE

Drug markets are often blamed for the elevated level of all these forms of violence in many cities. Nevertheless, these figures on homicide, and their lack of direct correlation to the presence of drug markets, suggest that other factors are also influential. Indeed, it is highly unlikely that eradication of drug markets, however implausible that might be, would cause urban violence to simply disappear. This Report, however, will attempt to analyse the link between drug markets and urban violence in order to draw out lessons on how levels of violence can be reduced. It will pay particular attention to one city: Rio de Janeiro. This central case study shows the serious danger of allowing a violent drug market to become institutionalised in a city, and the grave problems associated with efforts to repress drug markets through violent action by the state. Examples from other cities, including Boston, New York and London, will also be used.

The link between drug markets and violence has often been examined through the “tripartite framework” developed by Goldstein in New York (Goldstein, 1985). This categorises three types of link between illicit drugs and violence. The first is the psycho-pharmacological link, where violence is associated with the effects of drugs in stimulating anxiety and aggression in users. The second is economic-compulsive, which comes from dependent users having to commit crimes to feed their habit. The third is systemic violence. This type is perhaps the most interesting for this Report. It is important to remember that violence is not the only way that conflicts in drug markets are dealt with. Other strategies used by drug dealers include negotiation, avoidance and tolerance (Jacques & Wright, 2008). However, since participants in the illicit drug market have no recourse to legal methods for avoiding and settling dispute they do often engage in violence to protect reputation, revenue, territory and profits. The extraordinarily high profit margins that are available to drug traffickers and dealers also provide great incentives to take the risks to both life and liberty that come with violent behaviour. (See Beckley Foundation Drug Policy Programme Report Number 14 on drug markets (Wilson & Stevens, 2008, http://idpc.info/php-bin/documents/BFDPP_RP_14_UnderstandDrgMkts_EN.pdf)

CASE STUDY 1: Not so marvelous: drug trafficking, violence and failed policies in Rio de Janeiro

Rio de Janeiro is a megalopolis of about 6 million inhabitants (almost 11 million if its metropolitan area is considered). Its inhabitants (known as cariocas) call it the “marvelous city” because of its natural beauty, its tourist attractions, its cordial people and its rich cultural background. However, the city has experienced economic crisis since the 1980s and this has led to deep inequalities within society and a high proportion of employment in the informal economy (Urani, Fontes, Chermont & Rocha n/d; Paes de Barros, Mendoza & Rocha, 1995). The 1980s also saw the rise of the cocaine industry in South America and Brazil joined the illicit industry as a supplier of chemical precursors for the production of cocaine in the Andean Countries, as well as being a main trafficking route to consumption markets such as Western Europe, South Africa and, secondarily, the United States (Dreyfus, 2002; Downey, 2002:25). While it is true that other illegal markets are responsible for generating high levels of urban violence within the city, the illicit drug market has undeniably had an extraordinarily deleterious impact upon the lives of many inhabitants of the favelas.

The drug market: from ruthless monopoly to chaotic oligopoly

The recurrent and historical lack of State presence in the favelas of Rio de Janeiro enabled the emergence of criminal organizations that control these areas. While these groups use firearms bought in transnational markets, Brazil also has a thriving small arms and ammunition industry of its own. This industry has only been effectively regulated since 2003. Inequality, high demographic density, uncompleted primary school studies, lack of opportunities to access the legal economy, and weak family structures are among the main factors that can be seen to provoke the involvement of young men (between 15 and 29 years old) in organized crime and armed violence (Dreyfus & Bandeira, 2006; Dreyfus, Lessing & Purcena, 2005; Small Arms Survey, 2007).

Widespread police and institutional corruption has also enabled the development of drug distribution networks and diminished the law enforcement capabilities of the State (Câmara dos Deputados, 2000). Cocaine, and coca paste consumed in Rio de Janeiro and other Brazilian cities is mainly produced in Bolivia (UNODC, 2007). By the year 2000, it was estimated that around 44.4 wholesale tonnes or 171.4 US$ million worth of cocaine were entering the city to be then cut and sold at the street level (Downey, 2003). By the late 1990’s, it was estimated that there were 500 drug retailing “areas” (there are around 700 favelas in the city) of which 30 to 50 areas (the most profitable) had a commercial sales (movimentos) of about 3000 small doses (“papeis”) of cocaine per day (Misse, 1997). This quantity may double during weekends. Each consumer purchased, on average, 5 to 10 papeis per transaction (Misse, 1997). In 2003 it was estimated that drug faction employees accounted for around 1% of Rio’s favela population (meaning around 10,000 people). They are armed, leaving aside handguns, with about 1,500 assault rifles and other automatic weapons (Downey, 2003, p.51). These faction members are part of a larger illicit working force in underground illicit activities in the city, such as illegal gambling, prostitution, irregular transportation and clandestine sales of counterfeited goods (Misse, 1997).
There have been networks of illicit drug distribution in Rio de Janeiro since the 1950s. These were linked to the consumption of marijuana within the favelas, prisons and a number of established points in the city usually related to delinquent activities such as illegal gambling and prostitution (Misse, 1999, Misse 1997). In the 1970s the consumption of marijuana expanded to middle class students and intellectuals (Misse, n.d). Marijuana trafficking was, however, diffuse and carried out by community members to a small and localised clientele (Dowdney, 2003). Due to cocaine’s greater profitability, Rio de Janeiro’s drugs market was restructured during the 1980s in terms of its scale, organization and the armed competition and territorial disputes between rival factions (Dowdney, 2003, p.26).

As explained by the anthropologist Luke Dowdney, the current crime networks that retail illicit drugs in Rio de Janeiro originate in the prison system, and are recreated, structured and even organized through that system:

“The systematic organisation of Rio de Janeiro’s retail drug market has its roots in prison with the creation of the first and arguably still the most powerful drug faction, the Comando Vermelho. In response to the rising number of bank robberies being carried out by anti-government groups in order to finance revolutionary activities against Brazil’s military state apparatus […] the government introduced by decree article 27 of the National Security Law of 1969 (Lei de Segurança Nacional). As a result, all suspects of armed robbery of banking, financial or credit institutions were tried by a military court. If convicted, perpetrators of these crimes faced between 10-24 years in a maximum-security prison, or the death penalty if any fatalities occurred during the robbery. Therefore, between 1969-1976 political and common-law prisoners mingled in a number of maximum-security prisons including Cândido Mendes on Ilha Grande, three hours West of Rio de Janeiro. […] As a result, a number of imprisoned bank robbers formed a group called ’the collective’ (o coletivo) at the end of the 1970s, which was to become known as the Falange Vermelha and later the Comando Vermelho. The Falange Vermelha originally concerned itself with group protection and domination of the prison population, as well as securing rights within the prison system. However, its real importance within the city’s criminal structure came when its members realised that their internal prison organisation could be used to organise crime outside of prison for profitable gain. Being based in prison, the Comando Vermelho had power over its members both within and outside the prison system, as every professional criminal knows that if released they may one day be rearrested and incarcerated again. Failing to fulfill the Comando Vermelho’s instructions whilst free, would mean returning to prison as a traitor to be punished by the group. […] The Comando Vermelho was born in prison and its power remains there to this day. By the end of the 1970s the Comando Vermelho’s incarcerated members began to organise criminal activity (primarily bank robberies and kidnappings) within Rio de Janeiro and were subsequently able to buy their freedom with illicit earnings dutifully brought into prison.” (Dowdney, 2003:20)

This “coalition” of local criminal leaders took over the traditional marijuana retailing points between 1983 and 1986 and organized a territorially based structure for the distribution of the more lucrative cocaine. The Comando Vermelho is not a highly structured body, but a group of independent local leaders (donos) joined through loose alliances. This single faction monopoly did not last long. The death of some important founding members of the Comando Vermelho in the second half of the 1980s - as well as the high profits generated by some strategic retailing points in the city - led to distrust, rivalry and armed competition. By the mid 1990s, other factions led by new (and younger) donors emerged. These included the Terceiro Comando and Amigos dos Amigos (Dowdney, 2003). The three groups are now in permanent armed competition and exert a violent domination over Rio’s favelas. This permanent killing combined with the saturation of the consumption market and a decrease in drug profits has led to a weakening of the drug factions during the current decade (Dreyfus, 2007; Misse, 2007; De Souza e Silva, Lannes Fernandes & Braga, 2008). The decline of the drug factions combined with a continuing lack of State control within the favelas enabled another kind of illicit armed group to grow in influence. These are the so-called “milícias,” vigilante organizations formed by retired and active duty policemen and firemen. Their aim is to drive traffickers and drug consumers out of poor neighbourhoods and exert a new kind of territorial control based on the use of violence and financed by racketeering to local commerce and the administration of other illicit activities such as illegal gambling, irregular public transportation networks and irregular cable TV and electricity services. (Dreyfus, 2007; Misse, 2007; De Souza e Silva, Lannes Fernandes and Braga, 2008) Whether or not the milícias will also become involved in drug trafficking is a question only time will answer. The lack of State presence and the limited capacity of State institutions (which are compromised by corruption) are at the core this process of illegal armed territorial control in the favelas of Rio de Janeiro (Dreyfus, 2007).

**Misstaken policies and policing: the costs of Rio de Janeiro’s peculiar war on drugs**

Rio de Janeiro’s policies regarding drug trafficking and use have followed the general national policy trend and legislation: they have focused on repression. In Brazil, the law enforcement powers of the municipal governments are very limited; in fact, according to the national constitution, law enforcement is a prerogative of federal and state security forces. Each state in Brazil has two police forces, an investigative police (the civilian police) and a preventive police (the military police). Since the late 1980s when the increasing territorial control and armed power of the drug factions became evident, successive governments of the State of Rio de Janeiro opted for a “war on drugs approach”. The main instrument in this war on drugs has been the Military Police.
(particularly through special and heavily armed intervention units) and specialized intervention units of the Civilian Police. Instead of supporting community policing programmes that would allow an eventual penetration of state institutions and some sense of the rule of the law within the favelas, historically State governments have preferred “invasive” and “siege” approaches, characterized by violent, brief and lethal irritations and by sporadic controls and searches in the surrounding areas or main accessing points (Downnedy, 2003; Ribeiro, Dias and Carvalho, 2008). The number of deaths registered as “resistance to authority” (autos de resistência) during police operations climbed from 427 casualties in 2000 to 1330 in 2007 (ISP, 2007). This approach to the problem has caused a spiral of violence and an arms race between the police and the traffickers. The inefficacy of all this on policy is aggravated by the provision of protection and diverted small arms by corrupted sectors of the police in exchange of money or drugs (for later retail). These extortive practices also happen at a minor scale with small retailers and drug consumers who must pay a bribe in order not to be arrested (Misse, 2007).

At the national level a major change occurred in 2006, when - under the administration of President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva - a new drug control law (number 11343 of August 2006) was introduced. This law still classes drug possession and use as a crime, however, it makes a clear difference between traffickers and users. In the case of users or possession for personal use it offers rehabilitation, community service or a simple warning from the judge, rather than jail. It is left to the judge to define on a case by case basis, which drug quantity should be defined as for personal use. The administration of President Lula also created a new drug control policy that provides treatment for drug dependents, establishes the need for a partnership between government and civil society for drug prevention and also introduces the concept of harm reduction (Olinger, 2007a, and 2007b). So far, in Rio de Janeiro, this change in the legislation has only been only reflected in the fact that the government shifted its focus from repressing consumption, possession and trafficking to focusing almost exclusively on repression though the war on drugs model described above (Misse, 2007). This model has proved to be ineffective: the drug factions still control the favelas, illicit drugs are openly available, and the prevalence of cocaine use in big cities in the south east of Brazil (where Rio de Janeiro is located) rose from 2.6% in 2001 to 3.7% in 2007 (CEBRI, 2001; CEBRI, 2005).

**HOW STRONG IS THE LINK BETWEEN DRUG MARKETS AND VIOLENCE?**

If a city has a drug market, it does not automatically mean that it will be particularly violent. For example, Washington DC apparently has a murder rate that is 5 times higher than New York. But the estimated prevalence of last year use of crack is the same (at 0.3% of the population), and heroin use is apparently lower in Washington than in New York (SAMHSA, 2006). However, there have been many studies that link drug markets to violence. For example, a study of eight cities by the US National Institute of Justice found that those cities with larger markets for crack cocaine tended to have higher rates of homicide. There was no association between levels of use of other drugs and murder (Lattimore, Riley, Trudeaue, Leiter, & Edwards, 1997). Since then, there have been many studies that have suggested a link between crack markets and violence, including reports that attribute the fall in homicide in the USA (and New York City in particular) to the decline in crack use (Blumstein, Rivara, & Rosenfeld, 2000; Bowling, 1999; Messner, Galea, Tardiff, Tracy, Bucciarelli, Piper et al., 2007). Other factors are also mentioned in these studies, including economic change, policing tactics, increased incarceration, demographics (e.g. the proportion of young men in the population) and the availability of firearms.

Research from Latin America highlights the importance of socio-economic factors. There are very wide differences in the rates of violence between the nations of Latin America. For example, Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica and Uruguay have been noted for having rates of violence that are lower than the global average. But Colombia, El Salvador, Venezuela and Honduras have had rates over three times the global average (Briceno-Leon, Villaveces, & Concha-Eastman, 2008). Briceno-Leon and his colleagues find that it is those countries with the highest rates of poverty, combined with high rates of urbanisation, that have the highest murder rates. They argue that drug markets have a part to play in explaining these differences, but that lack of employment opportunities, urban segregation, a culture of extreme masculinity and easy availability of guns and alcohol are also important.

The complexities of the link between drug markets and violence mean that we should pay attention to – at least – the influence of different types of drug market and the different social contexts in which they operate.

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* It is important to recognize the role of markets surrounding among other things the illegal lottery, video poker machines and clandestine transport networks in the generation of violence within the city.

** These have been the focus of the highly acclaimed and controversial Brazilian film Elite Squad (José Padilha, 2007)
TYPES OF DRUG MARKET

There are various stages in the journey of a drug from crop to consumer. Each is associated with various forms of violence. These stages are:

- Production
- Transit
- Distribution

At the production stage, violence is employed in controlling the crops from which drugs are produced. For example, individuals and groups who want to protect their crops from being seized by state agencies or criminal rivals may use violent methods. This has been seen most frequently in Colombia in clashes between farmers and factions of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) or its paramilitary opponents (Vargas, 2005). Violence is also employed by state agencies in attempting to deter production and destroy or confiscate the crops. Direct forms of violence have the highest profile in Afghanistan. Here, the Taleban severely restricted opium production in 2001 through threats of violence to farmers who grew opium (Farrell & Thorne, 2005). NATO soldiers are currently engaged in ongoing deadly operations to control the opium fields of Helmand and other provinces. According to press reports, military sources acknowledge that faulty intelligence has led to civilian casualties in these operations (Sengupta, 2008). Elsewhere less direct forms of violence have included the poisoning and displacement of farmers through the use of aerial fumigation - which has severely damaged Colombia’s rainforest (Livingstone, 2004; Ramirez Lemus, Stanton, & Walsh, 2005) - and the forced labour of workers in rural Brazil to grow or destroy marijuana crops (Transnational Institute, 2004).

Significant levels of violence are associated with the transit of drugs to markets in Europe and the USA through regions such as Central America, the Caribbean and increasingly West Africa. The most brutal violence at the time of writing is concentrated in the border towns of Mexico, where heavily armed trafficking gangs are involved in intense conflict amongst themselves and with state authorities. These so-called ‘cartels’ have long been the target of Mexican and US attempts to halt the trafficking of cocaine, methamphetamine and marijuana into the USA. The United Nations estimates that 90% of the cocaine consumed in the USA enters through Mexico, with the other 10% entering via the Caribbean (UNODC, 2008a). Following the imprisonment of several leaders of the Gulf ‘cartel’ in 2003, the Sinaloa ‘cartel’ aggressively attempted to seize control of their lucrative smuggling routes. The conflict this unleashed produced an upsurge of violence in border cities such as Tijuana, Nuevo Laredo and Cuidad Juárez. Official responses to this phenomenon, however, have been undermined by corruption within many parts of the Mexican law enforcement apparatus. According to the Mayor of Juarez, for example, “Corruption is so strong with the [city police] force, there are so many inside deals, that the criminals hardly worry about getting caught” (Campo-Flores & Campbell, 2008). Perhaps more significant, amidst allegations of links to the Sinaloa ‘cartel’, the head of Mexico’s military style federal police was forced to step down in November 2008 (Tuckman, 2008.) There are numerous other examples of high-level corruption (Economist, 2008) and there have even been reports of federal officers kidnapping and killing on the orders of drug traffickers.

The current dynamic has its origins in President Calderón’s December 2006 response to the escalation in drug related violence within the country. Then, intensifying the policy of his immediate predecessor Vicente Fox, he ordered a military crackdown. There were initial reports of success by the autumn of 2007; in the fight against the Gulf ‘cartel’ for example. Since then, however, so-called ‘inter-cartel violence’ has flared up as factions have sought to develop or defend trafficking corridors, particularly those into the United States. For instance, the 2008 death toll in Juárez alone was more than 1,300 by the end of November; a situation that has led commentators to compare the city with a failed state (Campo-Flores & Campbell, 2008). Further west in Tijuana, one week in the autumn of 2008 saw 50 people murdered with the increasingly common and grizzly discovery of severed heads within the city becoming indicative of the high levels of brutal violence that characterize the current phase of bloodletting. Despite several murders and arrests of leading members of trafficking groups, there is no sign that the extreme levels of violence involving drug ‘cartels’ and the state authorities will end soon. Furthermore, while perhaps understandable bearing in mind the extent and nature of the challenges faced, an increasingly militarized response to the situation from the Mexican authorities has actually gone a long way to sustain the cycle of violence. As noted elsewhere, “More military involvement in the ‘drug war’ has increased corruption within the institution, generated human rights violations and failed to make a dent in the narcotics trade.” Accordingly a more appropriate response would involve making reforms to police and justice systems (Meyer, M., Youngers, C. & Bewley-Taylor, D., 2007.) This is an increasingly significant point when considered within the context of the forthcoming US aid package known as the Mérida Initiative. The package, which is aimed at assisting Mexico address its security crisis, particularly the violence associated with the illicit drug trade, includes $500 million in equipment, training and other forms of assistance (Cook et al, 2008.) According to comments made by the US Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, on a recent visit to Mexico, the money will be disbursed “soon” (Economist, 2008.) Yet, as the Washington Office on Latin America note, “judging by the [Mexican] Administration’s funding request, the Mérida Initiative sees drug trafficking almost exclusively as an operational law enforcement issue, equipping police and military units to fight traffickers, measuring success in terms of how many drugs are impeded from entering the United States and how many traffickers are arrested, and containing little support for long-term institutional police and justice reform in Mexico” (WOLA, 2008.) As such, not only does the initiative do nothing to address the crucial issue of reducing drug demand in the United States, it also looks set to
An upsurge in violence in the Caribbean has also been related to conflicts between drug traffickers and state authorities. The murder rate in Trinidad & Tobago increased by a factor of four between 1999 and 2005. High profile, naval successes in seizing drugs in Caribbean waters have not prevented the rise in violence in the region. Indeed, murders have tended to spike upwards after the arrest of key players in drug trafficking operations, as their subordinates fight to win control (Bowling, 2008). Law enforcement efforts which displaced drug trafficking activities from Colombia to the Caribbean, combined with the increasing demand for cocaine by European consumers, have more recently stimulated the creation of the “West African corridor” to transport cocaine to Europe (Ibid, UNODC, 2007, 2008b), with disastrous results for the residents of Bissau, Lomé and Cape Verde. This violence occurs far from the lives of Western consumers, whose media have paid more attention to the retail drug market. Here, the stereotypical encounter is between the armed drug dealer and the desperate addict. Although such encounters do occur, they are not typical of all retail transactions. Retail markets are not necessarily and continually violent. The absence of violence and the presence of cooperative relations between street drug dealers has, for example, been noted in two street heroin markets in Sydney, Australia (Coomber & Maher, 2006). This relative calm was presaged by an outbreak of violence in 1999 and 2000 in the Cabramatta area. This was reported to arise from conflict at higher levels of the market between competing criminal gangs (Ibid).

The type and level of violence depends largely on the nature of the drug market, which is often shaped by the law enforcement response to it. An excellent illustration of this point comes from 20 years of ethnographic work on the streets of New York (see case study 2). Open air, street-based drug markets often tend to be violent, as dealers compete for cash, customers, territory and reputation. Interviews with active drug dealers in St Louis, Missouri found several motives for violence (Topalli, Wright, & Fornango, 2002). These included vengeance for robberies, the maintenance of reputations for dangerousness and the recovery of losses of cash and drugs. One of the interviewed dealers emphasised how important it is for street drug dealers to be known as potentially violent. “Without that [a reputation] you'll get robbed every time you come out of the house.” He also summed up his fatalistic acceptance of the high levels of violence with the statement, “you live by the gun, you die by the gun”. But it is not only those who “live by the gun” who die by it. Violent robberies lead to retaliation and to further robberies to try to replace stolen money. Instrumental conflicts which may have originally been about cash and drugs bring in peers who feel they must engage in expressive violence in order to demonstrate their toughness. Cycles of violence, robbery and revenge are set up that suck in increasing numbers of people who have the misfortune to live in the socio-economically deprived areas which are most affected by open, street markets.

By contrast, the development of delivery-style markets is associated with a welcome reduction in violence. While in open street markets, violence is used to communicate with potential competitors, hidden, delivery style dealers consciously avoid violence in order not to attract the attention of rivals and the police. Even though they may not lead to an overall reduction in the amount of drugs being consumed, hidden markets have other advantages. These include the absence of open street dealing, with all the negative effects that they produce for community safety, neighbourhood reputations and motivations for young men to aspire to criminal lifestyles. It seems that delivery markets are also more mobile, with dealers switching delivery points often to fox the police and rival dealers (May, Duffy, Few, & Hough, 2005). This means that, in closed, delivery-style markets, the reduction in violence is accompanied by a reduction in the spatial concentration of drug market related problems in poor neighbourhoods.

As noted above, the rise and fall of violence in many US cities in the 1980s and 90s, has often been associated with the rise and fall in crack markets. Elevated levels of violence have been observed by police officers and criminologists after the introduction of crack to several countries, including the USA, the Caribbean and the United Kingdom (e.g. Braga, 2003). Crack cocaine has the psycho-pharmacological effects of inducing aggression, while heroin tends to sedate. Heroin does not lend itself to binge use, as this would produce overdose and death. In contrast, crack is frequently used in binge patterns, with users seeking immediate access to cash - often while still under the influence of the last dose - to keep on taking more. This, combined with exceptionally high profit margins in selling crack, causes higher levels of violence related to this form of cocaine than to other drugs. A study of 218 drug-related murders at the height of the crack problem in New York in 1988 found that 54% were related to crack, mostly involving “systemic” violence between drug dealers, or dealers and users (Goldstein, Brownstein, Ryan, & Bellucci, 1997). It is important, however, to remind ourselves that not all drug dealers “live by the gun”. A drug dealer who was interviewed in Georgia, USA, reported that he had recently had money stolen from him by someone he knew. When asked what he was going to do about it, he replied, “fucking nothing, I mean, what am I gonna do – shoot him?” (Jacques & Wright, 2008: 243)
CASE STUDY 2: The evolution of violence in New York City drug markets

New York researchers, Ric Curtis and Travis Wendel (2007), have observed three phases in the evolution of retail drug distribution. The first phase involved distribution by criminal gangs who took on some of the characteristics of a legal corporation. There was a clear hierarchy, with leaders controlling access to imported drugs, and managing the division of labour between drug sellers, runners, lookouts and enforcers. Drug sales tended to be centred on fixed distribution points, often houses or apartments in deprived neighbourhoods. It was the enforcers’ job to ensure, through actual or threatened violence, that buyers and employees did not rip off the gang, and that rival drug selling operations were not able to compete in these areas. Violence was often deliberately spectacular (such as the torture by extraction of teeth reported in Southside, Queens in 1990) in order to rule the market through fear.

Police operations against these gangs became more sophisticated. The dominant model had been “buy and bust” operations which filled prisons with low level dealers, but made little dent in the gangs’ ability to keep selling drugs. These gave way to intelligence-led operations, involving lengthy surveillance, which enabled the police to arrest entire supply chains at once. As the main players in the drug market realised the dangers of being connected to the street level, and that operating from fixed locations exposed them to sustained surveillance, the market became more fluid. Between 1995 and 2000 there was a reduction in the proportion of interviewed arrestees who reported buying crack at fixed locations, and an increase in those buying them on the street (Taylor & Brownstein, 2003). Curtis and Wendel report that wholesale drug suppliers outsourced retail distribution to freelance drug dealers. These dealers could not afford to pay for enforcers, and so had to ensure access to lucrative selling locations by their own reputation for violence. This led to a wave of shootings.

Gentrification of many of the drug selling areas, combined with intensive policing, pressured the market again to take a new form. Curtis and Wendel report that the wider availability of pagers and mobile phones enabled the drug market to move indoors, to a model of ordered deliveries. This model started out in the marijuana business, and has since spread to other drugs. It involves an individual or partnership providing the capital to buy the drugs wholesale. The drugs are then distributed through a small team of couriers, directed by dispatchers. Labour relations tend to be less conflictual than in either the corporate or freelance model of street distribution. And violence is absolutely to be avoided, as the delivery teams are only able to operate in the absence of police attention.

CASE STUDY 3: The London crack market

Although many London cocaine users already knew how to make smokeable versions of cocaine, the retail trade in crack only took off in London in the late 1980s. In the early 1990s, its street price fell by 50% and use increased rapidly, especially in deprived areas of the inner city. Crack is sold in three types of market: open street dealing, delivery markets and from fixed locations, or crack houses. Crack houses have been further categorised into three types: fortified retail outlets, take-overs (where dealers take over the flat of a vulnerable tenant) and places which combine the sale of sex with the sale of crack (Greater London Alcohol and Drug Alliance, 2004). As in the USA, there has been much anecdotal reporting of increased violence in the vicinity of crack markets and houses, although there is less investment in statistical research to test these reports. Various high profile murders have been linked to the trade in crack. In September 2007, Amato Wright, 39, was convicted of murdering his mother. The prosecution argued that he did so in an attempt to get cash to buy crack. In February 2007, a 15 year old boy, Billy Cox, was shot dead at his home in Clapham in February 2007. Newspaper accounts attributed this to rivalries between crack dealers, but other accounts suggest that more trivial, reputational conflicts were involved. Two men have recently been charged with the fatal stabbing of Melvin Bryan, 18, in Edmonton in July 2008. One of them was also charged with possession of crack with intent to supply.

In response to fears over the effects of crack dealing, the Metropolitan Police have launched various operations to tackle the trade. In a recent book, Detective Sergeant Harry Keeble claims to have closed all the crack houses in Haringey in 1999 and 2000. He reports that he followed up intelligence reports and surveillance by raiding premises in force, with significant effects in reducing shootings and robberies in the area (Keeble & Hollington, 2008). However, violence rose again after the end of this operation. A more rigorously evaluated initiative, known as Operation Crackdown, using similar methods produced no effect on price, purity or perceived availability of drugs (Best, Strang, Beswick, & Gossop, 2001). This evaluation did not examine the effect on violence, and it is possible that operations such as this can encourage drug dealers to change their methods to become less visible and so less harmful to surrounding communities.

There are now reports that the London crack market has followed the New York pattern of becoming more closed, with less crack dealing from fixed locations, and dealers preferring to sell only to people that they already know (Pitts, 2008). As the effects of crack on its users have become more

* We are cautious about the reports of this book, as some quotes in it bear an uncanny similarity to dialogue from the HBO television series The Wire.
widely known, the rapid increase in users over the 1990s has slowed. The capacity of treatment agencies has expanded rapidly and the criminal justice system has been used to encourage crack users to enter treatment. The police have been given powers (including crack house closure orders) to close and seal premises that are being used as crack houses. Various community initiatives have been supported, which combine community development with youth work and drug treatment. Between 2002/3 and 2006/7, the number of murders in London fell by 10% and the number of recorded firearms offences fell by 14% (Povey, Coleman, Kaiza, Hoare, & Jansson, 2007). The effects of the crack market and its regulation in these reductions are unclear.

**DRUG MARKET CONTEXTS**

The effect of drugs on urban violence goes alongside the effects of poverty. A study of the increase in homicide rates in US cities between 1982 and 1992 found that violence increased fastest in those cities with increasing levels of socio-economic disadvantage (Strom & MacDonald, 2007). A different analysis of the links between homicide, drug markets and socio-demographic characteristics has also been carried out for 132 US cities between 1984 and 2000 (Ousey & Lee, 2007). This found that the effects of declining drug markets were significant in predicting reductions in violence, but that other factors, including the age profile of drug market participants, and changes in socio-economic conditions, were also influential. In cities where the average age of drug arrestees increased, and where socio-economic conditions improved, murder rates tended to decline fastest. An earlier analysis by Ousey and Lee which included pre-existing socio-economic conditions found that the relationship between drug markets and homicide depends on the level of resource deprivation in the city. Larger drug markets are associated with higher murder rates in poor cities, but not in rich ones (Ousey & Lee, 2002). Ousey and Lee (2007) also note that the statistical link between drug markets and homicide has reduced over time. They speculate that this may be because norms about the acceptability of violence and drug markets have both changed. As young people grow up in neighbourhoods contaminated by crack and violence, they can learn that there are better ways to live, as long as opportunities are provided to put this learning into practice.

This points to the importance of the concept of collective efficacy, which was also used by Strom and McDonald as part of the explanation for the increase in violence in the USA in the 1980s. Collective efficacy has been defined as “the linkage of cohesion and mutual trust with shared expectations for intervening in support of neighbourhood social control” (Sampson & Raudenbush, 1999: 611-612). Some neighbourhoods are better able to prevent and resist violence than others. This ability is influenced by levels of poverty, residential mobility and relationships with the police. Sampson and Raudenbush found that collective efficacy was lower in socio-economically deprived areas, and that both collective efficacy and socio-economic disadvantage were important predictors of disorder.

Mechanisms of informal social control can be damaged where local residents have no support from state institutions, or where there is conflict between local residents and the police. For example, if a resident who objects to drugs being sold outside her home can be killed with impunity by a drug dealer, with no serious investigation by the police, then this makes such informal control far less likely. And if the police are seen as being in conflict with the whole community, rather than just the offenders who live or work there, again this will damage the collective ability to reduce disorder. Even worse are situations where the police are seen as being corrupt and in the pay of drug traffickers, or to be engaged in serious violation of the human rights of local residents. Unfortunately, many of these problems affect the World’s most violent cities.

In some cases, the state itself can become one of the main sources of violence related to the drug market. Even if we leave aside those countries which still use the death penalty for drug trafficking offences, there are others (e.g. Thailand, Mexico and Brazil) where drug control policies, either explicitly or implicitly, have led to high levels of urban violence committed by state agencies. For example, in 2003 in Thailand a war on drugs was announced, with prominent politicians stating that the police were fully justified in using violence against drug dealers and that deaths were inevitable. In December 2003, the Royal Thai Police announced that 1,329 people had been killed in nine months, of whom 72 were reported as having been killed by the police. Witnesses reported numerous extra-judicial killings by agents of the state of people who had been placed on “blacklists” by local officials (Cohen, 2004). After a coup in 2006 replaced the Thai government, an official report found that half the people killed in the 2003 war on drugs had no link to the drug trade (The Economist, 2008). Drug traffickers are not the only source of lethal and other violence in the operation of drug markets.

A final influence on violence in the drug market is the availability of firearms. The profits afforded by drug sales provide the means necessary to buy guns through legal and illegal channels. So, once guns are introduced to a drug market, it is exceptionally hard to eliminate them. This provides an incentive both to prevent the development of violent drug markets and to limit the availability or firearms to players in these markets.
Overall, the available evidence suggests that there is a strong link between the presence of markets for illicit drugs and the level of urban violence. However, the strength of this link is influenced by several factors. These include:

- **The degree to which the wholesale drug trade has infiltrated the institutional structure of the city.** Cities in Latin America and the Caribbean where the drugs market has become entwined with local businesses, bureaucracies and politicians seem to be the most vulnerable to violence.
- **The type of retail drug market.** Hidden, delivery-based markets seem to be less violent than open street markets, especially when street markets involve chaotic competition between low-level dealers.
- **The type of drug being sold.** Crack markets tend to be more violent than markets for other drugs.
- **Socio-economic conditions.** Socio-economically deprived cities and neighbourhoods are more vulnerable to drug markets and related violence. Deprivation also causes low collective efficacy, which reduces the potential for informal social control of disorder and violence.
- **State violence.** When the war on drugs turns hot, then rates of urban violence can soar, as was seen in Thailand in 2003, and is still occurring in Mexico and Brazil.
- **The availability of firearms.** Drug markets flooded with automatic and semi-automatic weapons are naturally more lethally violent.

### CASE STUDY 4: Expanding the “Boston miracle”

At the end of the 1980s, the US city of Boston experienced a rapid upsurge in its murder rate, from about 15 per 100,000 in the mid-1980s, to 25 in 1990. These murders were heavily concentrated amongst young, black males, often using semi-automatic weapons that had recently been sold in the legal market. The victims tended to be residents of just a few, severely deprived neighbourhoods, including Roxbury, Dorchester and Mattapan. There was a significant overlap between perpetrators and victims of knife and gun crime. Many were members of street gangs involved in the expanding crack market.

After a notorious incident in 1992, in which rival gang members attempted murder during a funeral at the Morning Star Baptist Church in Mattapan, a coalition of faith groups was formed. Despite initial distrust between this Ten Point Coalition and the police, they worked together from 1996 in organising “gang forums”. These forums played a part in Operation Ceasefire in May of that year. This involved individual frequent, gang-involved offenders being invited to attend meetings with police officers, church ministers and social services personnel. They were given the choice between accepting offers of help with education, training and other services, or intensive attention from the police. It was made clear to them that any violent activity would lead to a speedy and tough response. The plan was widely publicised, and the police followed through on their threat to respond rigorously to offenders who violated the ceasefire. The initiative was led by the Boston Gun Project working group (sponsored by the National Institute of Justice and involving Boston Police Department alongside a wide range of partners). This project also focused enforcement attention on preventing the trafficking of semi-automatic weapons.

![Figure 1: Graph showing reductions in youth homicide during the Operation Ceasefire intervention (reproduced from Braga, Hureau, & Winship, 2008)](image)

An evaluation of Operation Ceasefire by researchers at the Harvard Kennedy School (Braga, Kennedy, Waring, & Piehl, 2001) found that it caused a significant decrease in the rate of youth murders, in comparison with other cities which did not use this approach. The 63% reduction in the monthly youth homicide rate led others to dub this the “Boston miracle”. The researchers differentiate this problem-oriented deterrence strategy (which they call “pulling levers”) from the more broadly focused order maintenance policing of New York City’s “zero tolerance” approach. Since this successful initiative in Boston, the pulling levers strategy has been evaluated in other US cities, including Minneapolis, Stockton and Lowell. The published evaluations all report that it has produced reductions in homicide which have not been seen in comparable cities that did not use this strategy (Braga, 2008; Braga, Pierce, McDevitt et al., 2008; McGarrell, Chermak, Wilson, & Corsaro, 2006). Another advantage of this approach is that it builds relationships with disadvantaged communities through partnerships with them, rather than damaging these relationships through the conflictual policing of the zero tolerance approach (Harcourt, 2002).
The problem with the Boston miracle is that it was not sustained. The police officer, Gary French, who led the project moved to new duties in 2000, and the partnership meetings ended. Manpower shortages in the early 2000s, combined with the effects on police priorities of the 9/11 attacks, made it difficult to continue strategic policing operations against youth homicides. Internal rivalries hampered efforts by both the police and the Ten Point Coalition. There were 43 murders in Boston in 1997. This had increased to 73 by 2005 (Bureau of Justice Statistics). In 2007, Operation Ceasefire was reinvigorated, with Gary French back in charge. There was a reduction in murders between 2006 and 2007, but no thorough evaluation has yet been published of this new chapter in the Boston story (Braga, Hureau, & Winship, 2008).

CONCLUSIONS

There are a number of general lessons for policy makers that can be taken from the research and case studies presented here. The first is that the majority of urban violence, as seen in those Latin American and Caribbean cities which are most severely affected, is related to trafficking, rather than the use of illicit drugs. While some urban violence is certainly perpetrated by individuals under the influence of illegal psychoactive substances, the extremely high profit margins associated with the illicit market incentivizes often-violent involvement in the drug trade. Countries which have not been able to impose the rule of law have struggled to reduce violence and corruption.

The second is that the link between drug markets and urban violence depends on the level and distribution of poverty. Cities that are less disadvantaged and less unequal are less vulnerable to the institutionalisation of drugs, guns and corruption which combine to produce violence. Social structures which exclude citizens from achieving culturally expected levels of consumption and autonomy breed resentment and encourage the development of underground economies, in which young men seek cash and respect through violence (Bourgois, 1997).

The third is that state action itself can be a major contributor or cause of urban violence. Drug policy and law enforcement methods do much to shape the drug market, even if they cannot eliminate it. As such, decisions made by governments and police officials have influenced the global pattern of drug-related violence, as well as the level of violence that drug dealers are prepared to engage in. For example, at the meta-level, over a number of years increased interdiction efforts along trafficking routes from Colombia to the USA has contributed to the development of violent trafficking pathways through the Caribbean and more recently West Africa. This has influenced levels of drug related urban violence within both regions, particularly the former. Further, arms races between dealers and law enforcement agencies at the city level has in some instances led to whole neighbourhoods being caught in the crossfire. The failure of the war on drugs model in Rio de Janeiro, for example, indicates that drug control models focused on repression need reevaluation. More measured operations in Boston, London and New York (all in very different socio-economic contexts to both one another and to Rio de Janeiro) have been able to have some positive impacts in reducing the violence associated with retail drug markets, even if there has been little apparent effect on rates of drug use.2

Some commentators have seen these lessons and taken them to mean that the appropriate response is to legalise the trade in currently illicit substances, as this would take the trade out of the hands of violent criminals. The potential effects in reducing violence, if poverty and corruption are not simultaneously eliminated, are debatable however. The effects on drug consumption are unpredictable. It has been argued that drug use and associated violence would inevitably rise (Inciardi, 1999), although this analysis concentrates on psycho-pharmacological violence by users, and not systemic violence by traffickers and dealers. It has also been argued that violence is not caused by the drugs market alone, but that these markets provide a context in which people who are already violent can operate, in neighbourhoods where violence accompanies economic and social exclusion (Sommers & Baskin, 1997). In any case, there is little political appetite for a wholesale departure from existing prohibition-oriented UN drug conventions in the countries that are most influential in their development and enforcement.

RECOMMENDATIONS

It is important to note that the recommendations we give here for reducing the link between drug markets and urban violence are provisional, as there have been very few rigorous tests of such responses. That said,

- Drug enforcement strategies must be based on a close understanding of the structure and dynamics of specific illicit drug markets. More time and effort needs to be invested in finding out about the particulars of local drug markets and the

2 It is also possible that the escalation of violent disputes in the retail drug trade might be halted if drug dealers could seek redress for robbery from the police (as women working as prostitutes can in cases of rape) (Topalli, Wright, & Fornango, 2002). It is very difficult, however, to imagine how law enforcement agencies could respond to robberies of drugs and related cash without criminalising the victim, and so deterring them from reporting these robberies.
violence associated with them. For example, which drugs are most popular? What form does the market take? Is violence in the locality directly related to drug markets, or to other causes? Who is most likely to participate and suffer from violence? What weapons do they use? What is the geographical and temporal pattern of these incidents? What local organisations are interested in working in partnership on this issue?

- Enhanced information must be used to focus more on the objective of reducing the violence associated with the illicit market rather than attempting to ‘win’ a battle with drug dealers. This latter approach can be counterproductive in terms of market disruption and subsequent escalations in violence. Put another way, law enforcement agencies, to use Wendel and Curtis’ phrase, should therefore do more to “train the dog” of drug markets (Wendel and Curtis, 2007.) For Wendel and Curtis, this concept means that just as a dog continually responds to the physical signals (not just the verbal commands) that its owner sends out, so drug markets are always responding to the signals that law enforcement agencies send out. If customs agencies manage to close down one smuggling route, drug traffickers will find another. If city police target one form of drug selling, drug dealers will change their tactics. Consequently, if these agencies focus on the most violent practices, traffickers and dealers are likely to shift to less violent ways of working. However, if these agencies then let up the pressure, traffickers and dealers will revert to the methods that are the most attractive and profitable to themselves, even if these are the most violent.

It is important to note here that these first two recommendations are implemented in the only evaluated intervention strategy that has been shown repeatedly to reduce urban violence related to drug markets. The “pulling levers” approach of Operation Ceasefire, including its direct engagement with drug dealers, and the projects it has inspired has been tested successfully in several cities. However, while interventions informed by Operation Ceasefire are being developed in Manchester, Glasgow and Southwark in the UK, it has not yet been tested outside the context of medium-sized US cities, which have different levels of drug use and violence to those experienced in cities in Latin America, Europe and the Caribbean. The Boston experience also shows how difficult it is to sustain the reductions achieved.

- Where compromised by corruption, law enforcement agencies and criminal justice systems must be overhauled. It seems clear that in some countries, such as Mexico and Brazil, the conditions necessary for the implementation of, for example, a “pulling levers” approach within urban areas are currently not present. As such, some level of reform is necessary in order to generate an environment amenable to the implementation of policies aimed at reducing drug related urban violence. Such reform efforts should include higher salaries, and enhanced oversight and control mechanisms to root out corruption and prosecute and sanction those who engage in corruption.

- Law enforcement agencies should stay within the rule of law when intervening in the drug trade. It is tempting to combat the illegality and damage associated with illicit drugs by taking extra-legal shortcuts that offer tough action. However, by undermining the rule of law, such actions increase the attraction of corruption and the possibilities for drug traffickers and dealers to set themselves up as defenders of the people against an oppressive state. Paramilitary operations by state agencies - or by other agencies supported by the state - are a form of violence and so are to be discouraged.

- Efforts should be made to reduce the availability of firearms in cities affected by drug markets. Of course, guns can be smuggled almost as easily as drugs can, so they will never be eliminated from the illegal drugs market. However, to make semi-automatic weapons legally available to drug dealers or their contacts, as was evidently happening in Boston in the mid 1990s, seems reckless, to say the least. It is worth noting here that an estimated 90% of the weapons used by Mexican drug ‘cartels’ are purchased at US gun stores and gun shows. It is, therefore, plausible to that the high levels of drug related violence within Mexico is at least partly attributable to lax gun controls north of the border. (Keating, 2008, Meyer, Youngers & Bewley-Taylor, 2007.)

- States should seek to reduce the levels of economic disadvantage and inequality in cities, especially within those most affected by the drug trade. While this recommendation relates to complex socio-environmental and economic issues that stretch beyond the realm of drug policy per se, it is clear that in these cities poverty and violence feed off one another. Consequently, reducing poverty will do much to reduce the temptations of young men to become drug sellers, of poorly paid police officers to ally themselves to drug traffickers and of violence to become regarded as a way of life. Violence may also be reduced by successful efforts to boost collective efficacy and social cohesion in poor neighbourhoods. However, any gains made will always be likely to slip back as long as the underlying poverty is not addressed.

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